RF-based WPTNs are deployed to transfer power to embedded devices over the air via radio frequency waves. Up until now, a considerable amount of effort has been devoted by researchers to design WPTNs that maximize several objectives such as harvested power, energy outage, and charging delay. However, inherent security and safety issues are generally overlooked, and these need to be solved if WPTNs are to become widespread. This article focuses on the safety and security problems related to WPTNs and highlights their cruciality in terms of efficient and dependable operation of RF-based WPTNs. We provide an overview of new research opportunities in this emerging domain.
IntroductIon
Over the past decade, powering cyber-physical systems has emerged as a growing challenge arising from the increasing demand for mobility, sustainable operation, and large-scale deployment. Conventional power cords have lost favor dramatically since they prohibit mobility and largescale deployments. Batteries, in contrast, increase weight, cost, and ecological footprint of hardware, and their replenishment is generally impractical. Fortunately, recent advancements have allowed the efficient and practical transfer of electromagnetic energy from a power source to receiver devices over the air, so-called wireless power transfer (WPT). In today's world, WPT is becoming more prevalent as demonstrated by the considerable number of companies trying to capitalize on WPT ideas, for example, WiTricity (http://witricity.com), uBeam (http://ubeam.com.com), Ossia (http://www.ossia.com), Energous (http://www. energous.com), Proxi (http://powerbyproxi.com), and Powercast (http://www.powercastco.com).
Thus far, WPT techniques have advanced in two major directions. Non-radiative techniques employ either inductive or magnetic resonant coupling for energy transfer to a wide range of appliances at short distances. In contrast, radiative techniques use the electric field of electromagnetic waves, typically RF waves, as an energy delivery medium to transfer power over longer distances. RF-based WPT exhibits many other practical advantages such as the provision of energy to many receivers simultaneously by means of its broadcast nature, low complexity, size and cost of the energy receiver hardware, and suitability for mobile devices. Currently, RF-based WPT has already reached sufficient maturity to charge low-power embedded devices such as sensors and RFID tags in practice. Without any doubt, future advancements in energy transfer efficiency will enable this technology to be an indispensable component of numerous embedded systems [1] , for example, wireless cameras [2] or sensors.
rF-bAsed WIreless PoWer trAnsFer netWorks
As RF-based WPT technologies become more feasible in practice, the natural next step is the deployment of specialized networks of dedicated WPT nodes, that is, wireless power transfer networks (WPTNs) [3] , aimed at transferring sufficient power to nearby energy receiver (ER) devices over the air. Energy transmitter (ET) devices forming WPTNs are capable of controlling their transmit power and time/frequency of the waveforms in order to charge different types of ERs demanding different levels of energy. Each ER is equipped with a harvester circuit that converts the received RF signal to a DC signal to charge its built-in battery. A prospective RF-based WPTN architecture is depicted in Fig. 1 . Up until now, a considerable amount of effort has been devoted by researchers to design WPTNs that optimize several objectives such as harvested power [4] , energy outage [5] , and charging delay [6] . In contrast, inherent safety and security issues in RF-based WPTNs have not yet drawn the attention of the research community.
sAFety And securIty In rF-bAsed WPt systems Long-range power transfer through radio waves brings safety and security problems that require new solutions. The main focus of security in RF-based WPT systems is to ensure the traditional security properties, confidentiality, integrity and availability [7] , of power transfer channels. On the other hand, in conventional radio communication systems, the secrecy of data and security of communication channels is also required.
Although there are plenty of commonalities considering safety and security of RF-based WPT and RF-based communication networks, there are certain aspects pertaining to safety and security in WPTNs that we would like to emphasize. These are:
• Wirelessly transmitted energy can be neither encrypted nor authenticated to ensure confidentiality of charging a specific harvester [8] . This makes power transfer channels vulnerable to attacks that: -Might threaten the security and safety of its users.
-Interfere with the efficient transfer of power.
• We expect that the radiated power from commercial WPTN systems will be (on average) higher, compared to radiated power from conventional RF communication transmitters. This is needed to maximize transmitted power at the receiving harvester. It is thus more likely that radiation safety thresholds are exceeded, unless power transmission is controlled in order to comply with safety regulations. • Conventional security mechanisms demand non-negligible computational resources [7] . However, RF-based WPTNs will not always be able to provide enough energy to perform computations related to security at the harvesting node. Hence, providing proper security under limited resources (in the form of harvested energy) becomes challenging.
A motIVAtIon eXAmPle
We shall now show that a small-scale WPTN formed by using off-the-shelf hardware can be abused to disclose the existence of a nearby person. In particular, we show that human presence in an indoor environment affects the harvested power that might allow ERs to localize the person and violate his/her anonymity. Here, our purpose is to stress that WPTNs are open systems where malicious ER devices (e.g., devices introduced by outsiders) can extract information from ongoing charging operations, which makes the whole system vulnerable to security and safety attacks. We deployed one Powercast TX91501 (as ET) and four P2110 evaluation boards with a 9 dBi patch antenna (as ERs) at fixed positions on a 2.5  2.5 m area, as presented in Fig. 2 . In this setup, both the ET and ERs had a ground clearance of 1 m, each ER's antenna was directed toward a different wall, and the ET was pointing toward ER 1. Conceptually, we divided the deployment area into square cells and assumed the midpoint of the cell at the center as the reference point (0,0) of our coordinate system.
At the beginning of our experiment, we turned on the ET and measured the initial harvested voltage level for each ER when there was nobody in the deployment area. Thereafter, we collected voltage levels from each ER for each cell when a person was standing in the midpoint of the corresponding cell. Voltage was measured with an oscilloscope at the D OUT of an ER by reading the voltage after D OUT stabilized. We present our measurements using heat maps for each of the four ERs, where the middle cell of each heat map presents the initial harvested voltage levels and other cells present harvested voltage levels when the person is present. We have the following observations: • Harvested energy is very sensitive to environmental conditions -the existence of a person in the deployment area can change the harvested energy considerably.
• Any ER can monitor the existence of a nearby person to some extent by observing the change in its harvested voltage; it can even report its observations to an attacker without the consent of users. For instance, ER1 in Fig. 2 can easily detect if a person is standing in front of it. Despite considerable limitations of this experiment (e.g., the ERs are stationary and the introduction of another person can signifi cantly alter the results), our result clearly indicates that the absence of security mechanisms might lead to unexpected vulnerabilities in WPTNs.
To the best of our knowledge this article is the first to introduce particular safety and security related challenges that might lead to a roadmap for future research in WPTNs. In the next sections, we explain the safety and security aspects of WPTN research in detail. sensors are equipped with a RF energy harvester circuit that converts radio waves into DC power. The circuit is composed of an antenna (or an antenna array), a matching component, a rectifi er, and energy storage (capacitor or battery). The stored energy is used to power the microcontroller, transceiver, and sensors. 
chAllenges For sAFe WIreless PoWer trAnsFer netWorks
A safe-charging WPTN must guarantee that none of its users are exposed to electromagnetic radiation (EMR) that exceeds a safety threshold (a detailed survey of the regulatory framework pertinent to WPT systems is given in [9] ). However, ensuring safety where the end users are allowed to deploy new ETs and modify the locations of existing ETs/ERs at runtime is challenging. Several ETs can be active simultaneously, aimed at charging ERs collaboratively to satisfy energy demands of the receivers as fast as possible, meanwhile optimizing the transferred energy. On the other hand, as more ETs are deployed, users might be exposed to more radiation. Unfortunately, determining a power transfer schedule for ETs in order to maximize power transfer and ensure EMR safety is an NP-hard problem [10] . In such a dynamic system, one should guarantee the safety considering runtime influence of unpredictable end-user actions. Within this context, we show how safety regulations might cause a conflict in practice.
chArgIng conFlIcts
Even though there are straightforward solutions to ensure power transfer safety that prevent RF exposure to some extent, several side effects might appear in practice. An interesting phenomenon might occur, which we denote as a charging conflict, resulting from abiding by the RF exposure regulations. Suppose that ER 1 is being charged by ET 1. Let neighboring ER 2 with an almost depleted battery send a request to charge to ET 2. If that ET 2 is turned on and starts transmitting energy, it might cause the RF exposure to exceed the safety threshold for ER 1. However, if it remains turned off, ER 2 might stop operating.
It is thus crucial to detect and resolve charging conflict. One solution might force ETs to keep track of the ERs inside their coverage region to coordinate their power transfer operation considering the status of neighboring ETs. For instance, the ET receiving a charge request can decide to turn itself on by considering the harvested energy levels at the ERs. If the requestor ER has a very low energy level, the neighboring ET can be informed to turn itself off if the ER who is currently being charged has sufficient energy to operate. However, such solutions introduce communication and storage overhead for the ETs. Moreover, it is challenging for ETs to keep track of the energy levels of all ERs since they should either query ERs for information or estimate it considering the transmitted power from all ETs. The former method introduces communication overhead, which in turn leads to additional energy consumption for the ERs. The latter method is nontrivial since wireless power density is hard to estimate and control due to reflection and refraction of the signals.
sAFe PoWer trAnsFer Is not eAsy
Wireless power density is the preferred quantity for use in safety regulations, since it does not rely on power absorption in human tissue. However, the specific absorption rate (SAR) and temperature show great potential to be used in safety regulations in the future due to their higher relevance to hazardous damages, such as on eyes [11] . Therefore, practical attempts and regulations are, for the moment, not sufficient to realize safe power transfer. Potential health impairments may indefinitely prevent widespread acceptance of WPTNs. We believe that extensive research efforts are required for the detection and prevention of unsafe power transfer operations in practice. In addition, safety regulations can also be abused to create several security attacks, as we present in the following sections.
securIty AttAcks In WIreless PoWer trAnsFer netWorks
We start by outlining our assumptions about the underlying WPTN and security goals. Then we elaborate on particular attacks arising from the lack of security mechanisms in WPTNs.
securIty model And goAls
It is assumed that ERs and ETs are equipped with transceivers to communicate using different wireless channels than those that are used for power transfer. In particular, we consider a WPTN as an open network of several ETs and ERs, where ERs can dynamically join and leave the WPTN. This requires open communication channels, which are prone to security attacks. Malicious nodes are defi ned as ERs and ETs that do not exhibit trustworthy behavior. The goal of the attacker is to degrade the power transfer performance and ruin the operation of the WPTN. Malicious nodes can eavesdrop radio packets, duplicate/modify their contents, generate new ones, and send incorrect information upon request (e.g., inaccurate battery or RF exposure levels). A secure WPTN should guarantee its integrity and availability, and preserve its sustainable, safe, and effi cient power transfer operation in the presence of malicious nodes.
sAFety AttAcks
Safety regulations can be abused to degrade the charging performance of ETs, even forcing them to stop working, leading to a denial of service. In particular, safe charging can be ensured by controlling transmission parameters of ETs (e.g., power, frequency, and transmission duration) according to feedback received from ERs about the RF exposure. However, if a malicious ER does not want its neighbors to be charged, it can always report that the RF exposure is over the safety limit. In such a case, ETs should either turn off their transceivers or reduce their transmission power. Therefore, the more safety attacks are made, the less efficiently ERs are charged, and, in consequence, the shorter their operation time.
As emphasized previously, it is almost impossible to estimate wireless power density precisely due to its sensitivity against environmental dynamics. Better measurement and estimation techniques are required for ETs to obtain the radio power distribution without feedback from ERs. To this end, a solution would be the deployment of a dedicated sensor network to collect RF exposure values from the environment, eliminating the need to receive feedback from ERs. However, this introduces additional overhead and cost for WPTNs.
chArgIng AttAcks
ETs should receive requests and feedback from ERs to transfer power to them in an efficient manner. However, malicious ERs may deliberately generate redundant or selfi sh requests and incorrect feedback to decrease the overall power transfer effi ciency of WPTNs (Fig. 3a) .
Freerider ERs: ETs equipped with omnidirectional antennas can be considered as public energy sources since any ER inside their coverage range can harvest energy. To exemplify, when any ET receives a charging request from a specifi c ER and starts charging it, nearby ERs can also harvest energy although they did not request it. In particular, we defi ne freerider ERs as devices that do not send charging requests but receive energy for free. While it might be desirable to charge multiple ERs simultaneously, thereby minimizing charging overhead, freerider ERs prevent ETs to be aware of which ERs they are charging. This situation will be problematic when ETs are required to charge only registered or authorized ERs.
Greedy and Cheating ERs: Since ERs experience the most benefi t when they always harvest energy, greedy ERs might send charging requests to ETs continuously, which may lead to other ERs receiving less power. This is even more problematic when ETs are equipped with directional antennas and beamform power only to the greedy ERs, which might prevent other ERs from receiving power. Therefore, ETs should implement fair power transfer mechanisms. Since it is very challenging to estimate harvested energy precisely rather than measuring it, ETs might prefer receiving feedback from ERs to collect information about their energy levels. Using this information, ETs can optimize their power transmission parameters. However, even though they have sufficient energy to perform their operations, cheating ERs might report that their current energy level is low or that they have harvested less energy in order to receive more power from ETs.
For system-wide efficient and correct WPT operation, robust and resilient approaches are required to prevent freerider, greedy, and cheating ER attacks. The natural first step is the detection of malicious nodes, which requires new methods for the precise estimation of harvested energy so that inaccurate information from greedy and cheating ERs can be crosschecked. One approach can be based on checking whether the received information is plausible or incorrect, which can be either discarded or corrected using historic information. Moreover, rather than relying on a single ER, information received from multiple ERs can be considered in order to identify malicious nodes. Another solution might be the introduction of an initialization routine that is performed at the deployment of the network. During this phase, fi xed ETs can determine the refl ected loss from authorized ERs. Changes in the reflected loss could help the detection of unauthorized ERs. Although we feel that this solution will be diffi cult in practice (any change in the environment will limit the accuracy of the method), the feasibility of this solution for RF-based WPTNs should be explored further.
After detection, new techniques should be developed to either penalize malicious nodes or reward secure ones to achieve fair charging. Regarding freeriders, ETs can modify their RF transmission parameters (e.g., frequency and power) at runtime, and share them only with those ERs that request energy, so only these are charged efficiently and less power is transferred to freeriders. For instance, if ETs are capable of providing energy using multiple frequency channels, they can send an encrypted message to the requestor ER carrying their frequency hopping sequence. Since other ERs will be unaware of the hopping sequence, their harvesting efficiency will be lower.
InterFerence AttAcks
WPTNs cannot be isolated from their environment. Interference generated by some other devices using the same frequency band might lead to significant charging performance degradation. Interference might be generated deliberately by an attacker in order to intercept WPT operation.
Beamforming Attacks (Fig. 3b) : When multiple ETs emit RF waves at the same frequency band simultaneously, the received waves by ERs can be either constructive or destructive. In constructive interference, where the phase differences between the transmitted signals are negligible, the received power is greater than that of individual energy waves. On the contrary, destructive interference occurs when the phase difference is large, leading to less harvested energy than that of the individual energy waves [12] . Not surprisingly, destructive interference is a potential threat, which can be produced by an attacker deliberately to decrease or destroy harvested energy at ERs and intercept the energy harvesting operation. This could potentially lead to a full collapse of system functionality.
Jamming Attacks (Fig. 3c) : Another type of attack is to create interference deliberately to intercept the communication between ETs and ERs. Malicious nodes can use one-channel jamming or sweep between all communication channels to jam them all. When the charging requests from the ERs are blocked, ETs will not be informed about the energy demands and therefore might stop charging. This might result in ERs running out of energy and stopping operation.
An important step to prevent interference attacks is interference detection, which can be achieved by turning off power transmission and communication periodically, listening in the network to find out if there is a suspicious RF transmission, and deciding if there is an attacker outside of the (known) network. However, attackers can also synchronize themselves to the interference detection period so that they will remain silent, leading to misdetection. Therefore, more robust and sophisticated methods are required in order to detect the existence of interference. After interference detection, ETs should dynamically adapt their transmission parameters so that ERs are not affected by the malicious nodes and receive energy efficiently. It is an open question how such adaptation can be realized and a network-wide consensus achieved for secure operation. Promising solutions against jamming attacks can be based on interference shaping techniques, such as interference alignment [13] , which allows ETs to propagate signals that align at the ER so that each receiver is able to decode its intended signal, and the aggregated interference effect is either minimized or eliminated. Although such techniques will allow ERs to receive data packets in the presence of jamming attacks, it is an open question how they can be implemented in WPTNs.
sPooFIng AttAcks
In WPTNs, ERs and ETs broadcast beacons that contain various types of information, such as the energy level, device identity, and so on. Malicious nodes can eavesdrop on the information of the other devices and use this information for their own benefit (Fig. 3d) . For instance, if a malicious node can predict the moment another ER will run out of energy, it can request energy just before that time in order to prevent ETs from sending energy and to stop that node's operation. What is worse, a malicious node might receive and store a charging request beacon from a particular ER and impersonate it by rebroadcasting to another ET to increase its RF exposure, create interference, or decrease throughput of the system. A standard solution for spoofing attacks can be the use of digital signatures that provide both data integrity and authentication to detect impersonating nodes. However, it might be challenging to devise and implement such solutions for resource-constrained devices [7] .
soFtWAre AttAcks
Another source of attacks is software applications that can be harmful for ERs and ETs. For example, a malicious application that consumes energy can deliberately force an ER to send frequent charging requests, which might interrupt the charging operation or decrease system efficiency. Such applications might also force ERs to stop operating altogether by depleting their batteries. One solution is running trusted applications by checking application signatures (e.g., 
Malicious energy receiver
H ig h R F e xp o su re energy consumption over time). If a malicious application is found, it should be deactivated. Another approach might be energy-aware scheduling of applications so that every application has a pre-defi ned energy budget for its operations.
monItorIng AttAcks
The attacks discussed so far can be considered as active attacks since they alter the operation of WPTNs explicitly. However, monitoring attacks are passive, and it is challenging to detect them since they do not involve any alteration of the data fl owing through WPTNs. To clarify, WPTNs can also be considered as wireless monitoring networks such that outsiders can introduce malicious ERs that receive energy from ETs to disclose private information without the consent of WPTN users. As an example, a malicious ER can be equipped with sensors that collect measurements and notify an attacker about the potential events inside the WPTN, analogous to the example scenario illustrated in Fig. 2 .
A solution to detect monitoring attacks can be listening to the communication channel periodically in order to detect an information exchange between malicious ERs and an attacker. However, if malicious communication is performed on a different channel, detection becomes complicated.
A summAry oF AttAcks
We summarize WPT security issues discussed so far in Table 1 , by presenting each security attack and its potential (high-level) countermeasure(s) that can be implemented to mitigate its effect. An important point worth mentioning is that countermeasures ensuring secure and safe energy transfer should be implemented as small and energy-efficient protocols. More precisely, as we remarked earlier, each issue should be solved while taking the limited resources of ERs into consideration [7] .
conclusIons RF-based WPTNs have already become a promising solution to power a wide range of low-power embedded devices wirelessly. So far, a considerable amount of research has been performed in this field. However, safety and security aspects are generally overlooked by the community. In this article, we show that WPTNs are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. We present several research challenges and unanswered research questions in the area of safety and security. 
